Abstract-In this paper, we propose new location privacy preserving schemes for database-driven cognitive radio networks (CRN s) that protect secondary users' (SU s) location privacy while allowing them to learn spectrum availability in their vicinity. Our schemes harness probabilistic set membership data structures to exploit the structured nature of spectrum databases (DB s) and SU s' queries. This enables us to create a compact representation of DB that could be queried by SU s without having to share their location with DB , thus guaranteeing their location privacy. Our proposed schemes offer different costperformance characteristics. Our first scheme relies on a simple yet powerful two-party protocol that achieves unconditional security with a plausible communication overhead by making DB send a compacted version of its content to SU which needs only to query this data structure to learn spectrum availability. Our second scheme achieves significantly lower communication and computation overhead for SU s, but requires an additional architectural entity which receives the compacted version of the database and fetches the spectrum availability information in lieu of SU s to alleviate the overhead on the latter. We show that our schemes are secure, and also demonstrate that they offer significant advantages over existing alternatives for various performance and/or security metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks (CRN s) have emerged as a key technology for addressing the problem of spectrum utilization inefficiency [2] - [8] . CRN s allow unlicensed users, also referred to as secondary users (SU s), to access licensed frequency bands opportunistically, so long as doing so does not harm licensed users, also referred to as primary users (PU s). In order to enable SU s to identify vacant frequency bands, also called white spaces, the federal communications commission (FCC ) has adopted two main approaches: spectrum sensingbased approach and geo-location database-driven approach.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCCN.2017. 2702163 prior to using it so as to avoid harming PU s. In the databasedriven approach, SU s rely on a geo-location database (DB ) to obtain channel availability information. For this, SU s are required to be equipped with GPS devices so as to be able to query DB on a regular basis using their exact locations. Upon receipt of a query, DB returns to SU the list of available channels in its vicinity, as well as the transmission parameters that are to be used by SU . This database-driven approach has advantages over the sensing-based approach. First, it pushes the responsibility and complexity of complying with spectrum policies to DB . Second, it eases the adoption of policy changes by limiting updates to just a handful number of databases, as opposed to updating large numbers of devices [10] .
Companies, like Google and Microsoft, are selected by FCC to administrate these geo-location databases, following the guidelines provided by PAWS (Protocol to Access WhiteSpace) [10] . PAWS protocol defines guidelines and operational requirements for both the spectrum database and the SU s querying it. These requirements include: SU s need to be equipped with geo-location capabilities, SU s must query DB with their specific location to check channel availability before starting their transmissions, DB must register SU s and manage their access to the spectrum, DB must respond to SU s' queries with the list of available channels in their vicinity along with the appropriate transmission parameters.
Despite their effectiveness in improving spectrum utilization efficiency, database-driven CRN s suffer from serious security and privacy threats. The disclosure of location privacy of SU s has been one of such threats to SU s when it comes to obtaining spectrum availability from DB s. This is simply because SU s have to share their locations with DB to learn about spectrum availability. The fine-grained location, when combined with publicly available information, can lead to even greater private information leakage. For example, it can be used to infer private information like shopping patterns, preferences, behavior and beliefs, etc. [11] . Being aware of such potential privacy threats, SU s may refuse to rely on DB for spectrum availability information. Therefore, there is a critical need for location-privacy preserving schemes for database-driven spectrum access.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two location privacy-preserving schemes for database-driven CRN s with different performance and architectural benefits. The first scheme, location privacy in database-driven CRNs (LPDB ), provides optimal arXiv:1806.03557v1 [cs.NI] 9 Jun 2018 location privacy to SU s within DB 's coverage area by leveraging set membership data structures (used to test whether an element is a member of a set) to construct a compact version of DB . The second scheme, LPDB with two servers (LPDBQS ), minimizes the overhead at SU 's side at the cost of deploying an additional entity in the network. The costperformance tradeoff gives more options to system designers to decide which topology and which approach is more suitable to their specific requirements.
Both approaches exploit two important facts: (i) Spectrum databases are highly structured [10] ; and (ii) SU s queries contain always the same device-specific characteristics (e.g., device type, antenna hight, frequency range, etc.) [10] . The highly structured property of the database refers to the fact that DB 's structure is usually agreed upon by the FCC and the database administrators, like Google, Microsoft, etc, and that the queries and messages exchanged by DB and SU s have a specific format in terms of what data they include. This well-defined information is available to both database administrators and SU s which allows them to have an idea on what kind of data the other party will include in its query/response, and also to compact both DB 's content and the queries using probabilistic data structures. In fact, and as recommended by the PAWS standard, the database should always reply to SU s with a set of predetermined information. This allows DB to compact its content to include only this information, which significantly reduces queried data sizes, and enables SU s to emulate DB 's response when querying the probabilistic data structure as we show next.
A desirable property of our schemes is their simplicity that is expected to facilitate their applicability in real-life applications. Our proposed schemes offer various cost-performance trade-offs that can meet the requirements of different applications. We study these tradeoffs and show that high privacy and better performance for SU s' can be achieved, but at the cost of deploying an additional architectural entity in the system. We show that our proposed schemes are secure and more efficient than their existing counterparts. In addition, we study the impact of system parameters on the performances of our proposed schemes, and compare them against those obtained via existing approaches.
Compared to our preliminary work [1] , this paper provides: (i) A new scheme, LPDBQS , with multiple deployment scenarios, that improves the overhead on SU s' side by relying on an extra architectural entity; (ii) An improvement to our previously proposed scheme, LPDB , by incorporating spectrum sensing to reduce the impact of the false positive rate of the used set membership data structure on spectrum availability information's accuracy; (iii) A detailed security analysis of the proposed schemes; and (iv) More detailed performance analysis with more evaluation metrics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We discuss related work in Section II. We present our system and threat models along with our security assumptions in Section III. Section IV provides a brief overview of the set membership data structure that we use in this paper. In Section V-A, we present our first scheme LPDB . We describe our second scheme LPDBQS in Section V-B. We evaluate and analyze the performance of the proposed schemes in Section VII, and conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Despite its importance, the location privacy issue in CRN s only recently gained interest from the research community [12] . Some works focused on addressing this issue in the context of collaborative spectrum sensing [13] - [17] while others focused on addressing it in the context of dynamic spectrum auction [18] . However, these works are not within the scope of this paper as we focus on the location privacy issue in database-driven CRN s.
Protecting SU s' location privacy in database-driven CRN s is a very challenging task, since SU s are required to provide their physical locations to DB in order for them to be able to learn about spectrum opportunities in their vicinities. Recently developed techniques mostly adopt either the kanonymity [19] , Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [20] , or differential privacy [21] concepts. However, direct adaptation of such concepts yield either insecure or extremely costly results. For instance, k-anonymity guarantees that SU 's location is indistinguishable among a set of k points, which could be achieved through the use of dummy locations by generating k − 1 properly selected dummy points, and performing k queries to DB using both the real and dummy locations. For example, Zhang et al. [22] rely on this concept to make each SU query DB by sending a square cloak region that includes its actual location. Their approach makes a tradeoff between providing high location privacy and maximizing some utility, which makes it suffer from the fact that achieving a high location privacy level results in a decrease in spectrum utility.
PIR, on the other hand, allows a client to obtain information from a database while preventing the database from learning which data is being retrieved. Several approaches have used this approach. For instance, Gao et al. [23] propose a PIR-based approach, termed PriSpectrum, that relies on the PIR scheme of Trostle et al. [24] to defend against a newly identified attack that exploits spectrum utilization pattern to localize SU s. Troja et al. [25] , [26] propose two other PIR-based approaches that try to minimize the number of PIR queries by either allowing SU s to share their availability information with other SU s [25] or by exploiting trajectory information to make SU s retrieve information for their current and future positions in the same query [26] . Despite their merit in providing location privacy to SU s these PIR-based approaches incur high overhead especially in terms of computation.
Using differential privacy, Zhang et al. [27] rely on the -geo-indistinguishability mechanism [28] to make SU s obfuscate their location. However, such a mechanism introduces noise to SU 's location which may impact the accuracy of the spectrum availability information retrieved.
There have also been other privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) that are not specific to CRN s but are designed to enable private queries over a database in general. However, many of these PETs are designed for applications that do not fit in the context of CRN s. For instance, oblivious random access memory (ORAM) [29] aims to enable a user to outsource its encrypted data to a database and to offer him/her the possibility to access this data while hiding the access patterns from the database [12] . Searchable symmetric encryption [30] is another PET that is largely deployed to privately outsource one's data to another party while maintaining the ability to selectively search over it [12] . These PETs are designed for protecting queries and searches over data that is outsourced to a database, which is completely different from the CRN scenario where the queried data belong to the database itself.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS

A. Database-driven CRN Model
We first consider a CRN that consists of a set of SU s and a geo-location database (DB ). SU s are assumed to be enabled with GPS and spectrum sensing capabilities, and to have access to DB to obtain spectrum availability information within its operation area. To learn about spectrum availability, a SU queries DB by including its location and its device characteristics. DB responds with a list of available channels at the specified location and a set of parameters for transmission over those channels. SU then selects and uses one of the returned channels. While using the channel, SU needs to recheck its availability on a daily basis or whenever it changes its location by 100 meters as mandated by PAWS [10] .
We then investigate incorporating a third entity to the network along with DB and SU s. This entity, referred to as query server (QS ), has a dedicated high throughput link with DB . QS is used to guarantee computational location privacy while reducing the computational and communication overhead especially on SU s' side.
B. Security Model and Assumptions
DB and QS are assumed to be honest but curious. That is, DB and QS follow the protocol honestly but may try to infer information on the input of other parties beyond what the output of the protocol reveals. Specifically, our objective is to prevent these two entities from learning SU s' location. Therefore, our security assumptions are as follows:
Security Assumption 1. DB and QS do not modify the integrity of their input. That is, (i) DB does not maliciously change SU 's query's content; (ii) QS does not modify the input that it receives from DB or SU . Security Assumption 2. DB and QS do not collude with each other to infer the location of SU s from their queries.
We further assume that the communication between different entities is secured by a cryptographic protocol like TLS [31] as suggested by PAWS [10] . This eliminates the risk of an adversary trying to eavesdrop the communication.
IV. SET MEMBERSHIP DATA STRUCTURES
Our proposed privacy-preserving schemes utilize set membership data structures to exploit the highly structured property of DB . There are several data structures that are designed for set membership tests, e.g. bloom filter [32] , cuckoo filter [33] , etc. However, in this paper, we opt for cuckoo filter as the building block of our schemes. We use cuckoo filter to construct a compact representation of the spectrum geolocation database as explained in Sections V-A & V-B. What motivates our choice is that cuckoo filter offers the highest space efficiency among its current well known alternatives, such as bloom filters. Besides, it has been proven to be more efficient than these alternatives especially for large sets. Finally, the cuckoo filter enjoys fast Lookup and Insert operations that are beneficial to our schemes.
A cuckoo filter [33] uses cuckoo hashing [34] and is designed to serve applications that need to store a large number of items while targeting low false positive rates and requiring storage space smaller than that required by bloom filters. A false positive occurs when the membership test returns that an item exists in the cuckoo filter (i.e., belongs to the set) while it actually does not. A false negative, on the other hand, occurs when the membership test returns that an item does not exist while it actually exists. In cuckoo filters, false positives are possible, but false negatives are not, and the target false positive rate, denoted throughout this paper by , can be controlled but has a direct impact on the filter's size. Figure 1 shows an example of a cuckoo filter that uses two hashes per item and contains 8 buckets each with 4 entries.
A cuckoo filter has mainly two functions: An Insert function that stores items in the filter, and a Lookup function that checks whether an item exists in the filter. In the Insert operation, cuckoo filter stores a fingerprint f of each item x, as opposed to storing the item itself. The space cost, in bits, of storing one item in the cuckoo filter using the Insert function depends on the target false positive rate and is given by (log 2 (1/ ) + log 2 (2β))/α where α is the load factor of the filter which defines its maximum capacity, and β is the number of entries/slots per bucket. Once the maximum feasible, α, is reached, insertions are likely to fail, and hence, the filter must expand in order to store more items [33] . The Lookup operation is performed by first computing a fingerprint of the desired item and two indexes, representing the potential locations (or buckets) of this item in the filter, and then checking whether these two locations contain the item.
V. PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we describe our proposed schemes. The first scheme, LPDB , is simple as it involves only two parties, SU s and DB , and provides unconditional location privacy to SU s within the coverage area of DB . The second scheme, LPDBQS , offers computational privacy with a significantly reduced overhead on SU s' side compared to LPDB , but at the cost of introducing an extra architectural entity.
Since we are unable to access the actual spectrum database, we relied on two sources to have an estimate of this structure: First, we have relied on the recommendation of the PAWS standard [10] , which defines the interaction between SU s and DB and what information they should exchange. Second, we used graphical web interfaces provided to the public by white space database operators like Google [35] , Microsoft [36] , iconectiv [37] , etc. These web interfaces comply with PAWS recommendation and allow an interested user to specify a location of interest and learn spectrum availability in that location to emulate the interaction between a SU and DB in real world. While the purpose of these interfaces was initially to provide a working platform as a showcase for FCC to acquire approval for operating spectrum database, we believe it has enough information to enable us to estimate the structure of the database and SU s' queries.
As required by PAWS, SU s must be registered with DB to be able to query it for spectrum availability. Registered SU starts by sending an initialization query to DB which replies by informing the SU of specific parameterized-rule values. These parameters include time periods beyond which the SU must update its available-spectrum data, and maximum location change before needing to query DB again. Afterwards, SU queries DB with an available spectrum query which contains its geolocation, device identifier, capabilities (to limit DB 's response to only compatible channels) and antenna characteristics (e.g. antenna height and type). DB then replies with the set of available channels in the SU 's location along with permissible power levels for each channel.
Based on these interactions between SU and DB , which we learned from PAWS and the database web interfaces, we estimate the structure of DB to be as illustrated in Table I . Each row corresponds to a different combination of location pairs (locX ,locY ) and channel chn. One location may contain several available channels at the same time. Note that even if the real structure deviates from the one illustrated in Table I (e.g. more/different attributes, more tables, etc), our schemes can be adapted to the new structure of both the queries and the database by designing or using a different probabilistic data structure(s). Also, even in this case, the PAWS standard requires that DB always replies to spectrum availability queries with a set of predetermined values that have to be in the database no matter what structure it has. In that case, DB only needs to insert these values in the cuckoo filter and this could be done independently from the database structure.
A. LPDB
In this section, we describe our basic scheme, which is referred to as location privacy in database-driven CRN s (LPDB ). The novelty of LPDB lies in the use of set membership data structures to construct a compact (space efficient) representation of DB that can be sent to querying SU s to inform them about spectrum availability. In our scheme, instead of sending its location, a SU sends only its characteristics (e.g., its device type, its antenna type, etc.), as specified by PAWS [10] , to DB , which then uses them to retrieve the corresponding entries in all possible locations. DB then puts these entries in a cuckoo filter and sends it to SU . Upon receiving this filter, SU constructs a query that includes its characteristic information, its location, and one of the possible channels with its associated parameters. SU then looks up this query in the received cuckoo filter to see whether that channel is available in its current location.
Parameters that are inserted in the response of DB may include the location, time stamps, the available channels, and the transmission power to be considered when using those channels. SU 's characteristics and DB parameters could be agreed upon beforehand between DB and SU s to make sure that SU queries the cuckoo filter with the right parameters.
The proposed LPDB scheme is illustrated in Algorithm 1, and briefly described as follows: First, each SU starts by constructing query to be sent to DB by including a set of characteristics, which are specific to the querying device, along with a time stamp ts. DB then retrieves the entries that correspond to query and constructs a cuckoo filter CF (which could be done offline). Since DB contains availability status for each channel in each location, the number of entries satisfying query will still be huge and one way to further reduce it is to retrieve only the information about available channels and ignore the other ones. Afterwards, DB concatenates the data in each row to construct x j as illustrated in Step 6, inserts it to CF and sends CF to SU .
SU constructs a string y by concatenating its location coordinates with a combination of one channel and its possible transmission parameters and tries to find whether y exists in CF by using the Lookup operation of CF . SU keeps changing the channel and the associated parameters until it finds the string y in CF or until SU tries all possible channels. Note that, depending on the false positive rate of CF , even if the Lookup operation returns T rue it does not necessarily mean that the specified channel is available. Setting to be very small makes the probability of having such a scenario very small, thus reduces the risk of using a busy channel, but this cannot be done without increasing the size of CF . To further reduce the risk of falling into this case, we have also included an additional sensing step to confirm the query's result and give more accurate information about the status of the channel of interest. If SU finds y in CF , then it needs to sense the specific channel found in y to confirm its availability. SU can conclude that this channel is free and thus can use it only if the sensing result coincides with CF 's response.
If, after trying all possible combinations, SU does not find y in CF , this means that no channel is available in the specified location as cuckoo filters do not incur any false negatives.
Algorithm 1 LPDB
x j ← (locX j locY j chn ts . . .);
7:
DB inserts x j into CF : CF .Insert(x j ); 8: DB sends CF to SU ; 9: SU initializes decision ← Channel is busy 10: for all possible combinations of par do
11:
SU computes y ← (locX locY chn i ts . . . par n );
if CF .Lookup(y) then
13:
SU senses chn;
14:
if Sensing(chn) ← available then
15:
decision ← chn is available; break; return decision When the size of DB is not large, then LPDB works well (as will be shown Section VII) by providing unconditional privacy with reasonably small amounts of overhead. However, a scalability issue may arise when the location resolution is very small (resolution used in DB could be as small as 50 meters) and/or the area covered by DB is large (e.g. at the scale of a country). In this case, the number of locations, and thus the number of entries in DB , can be large, and then even after relying on the cuckoo filter, the size of the data to be transmitted may still be impractical (e.g. in the order of gigabytes). This depends on the desired resolution and DB 's covered area. Next, we present a discussion about a possible way to deal with this scalability issue in the case of a very large DB .
Performance-privacy tradeoff: As discussed before, LPDB may suffer from a scalability issue when the size of DB 's coverage area is very large. We can address this issue through the following observation. When the covered area is large and/or the location resolution is small, allowing DB to learn one of SU 's coordinates can drastically reduce the number of entries that DB retrieves. This leads to considerably reduce the size of CF to be transmitted, thus making the approach scalable. Interestingly, in the case of large areas, revealing one of SU 's coordinates does not make it any easier for DB to infer SU 's location. To illustrate this, let's for example assume that DB covers the entire surface of the United States, as shown in Figure 2 . Allowing DB to learn one coordinate (e.g the latitude) means that it can only learn that SU is located somewhere on the blue line that spans the latitude of the whole country. But since DB does not know the longitude of SU , then knowing the latitude only does not offer any practical information about SU 's location.
Figure 2: Location Leakage
This, as shown in Section VII-A, drastically reduces the size of CF transmitted by DB at the cost of loosing the unconditional location privacy of SU s. However, when the coverage area of DB is large, even revealing one of the coordinates still achieves high location privacy of SU s. Indeed, since databases (like those managed by Microsoft and Google) may cover an entire nation of the size of the United States, the revealed information is not sufficient to localize SU , yet, this reduces our scheme's overhead substantially. The example of the United States in Figure 2 shows that our scheme can offer high privacy even when one of the coordinates is revealed. Throughout, we refer to this variant of our scheme as LPDB with leakage.
It is worth reiterating that when the covered area is not too large, then the size of the cuckoo filter is practical and there is no need to reveal one of SU 's coordinates. In this case, our scheme, LPDB , provides unconditional privacy without incurring much overhead. The system regulator can decide about which approach to follow depending on the system constraints and the size DB 's covered area.
B. LPDBQS
In this section, we propose a new scheme, LPDBQS , which offers better performance at SU s' side than that of LPDB . This comes at the cost of deploying an additional entity, referred to as query server (QS ), and having a computational security as opposed to unconditional. QS is introduced to handle SU s' queries instead of DB itself, which prevents DB from learning information related to SU s' location information. QS learns nothing but secure messages sent by SU s to check the availability of a specific channel.
• Intuition: We introduce QS to avoid sending CF , which might be large, to SU . Instead, CF , that contains HMAC secure entries inserted by DB using a secret key provided by SU , is sent to QS through a high throughput link pre-established with DB . SU just needs to query, using HMAC messages, QS which looks for its queries in CF .
Using HMAC , SU can hide the content of the query string, which includes its location information, among others, from QS which ignores the key used to construct the hashed query and the CF . This not only prevents QS from learning the query's content but also the entry that matches it in the filter. As most of the computation and communication overhead are incurred by both DB and QS , this scheme is the most efficient in terms of overhead incurred by SU s. LPDBQS is summarized in Algorithm 2 and described in the following.
Algorithm 2 LPDBQS Algorithm
1: SU queries DB with query ← f (k, char , ts); 2: DB retrieves resp containing r entries satisfying char ; 3: DB constructs CF k ; 4: for j = 1, . . . , r do x j ← (locX j locY j ts . . . row j (c)); 7:
8: DB sends CF k to QS over a high throughput link; 9: SU initializes decision ← Channel is busy 10: for all possible combinations of par do
11:
SU computes y ← (locX locY chn ts . . . par n );
12:
SU computes y k ← HMAC k (y) and sends it to QS ;
13:
QS looks up for y k in CF k using Lookup;
14:
if CF k .Lookup(y k ) then
15:
SU senses chn; 16: if Sensing(chn) ← available then
17:
decision ← chn is available; break; return decision First, SU starts by sending a secret key k, pre-established beforehand, along with its device characteristics to DB . DB then retrieves only the entries that have available channels and that also comply with the device characteristics of the querying SU . Afterwards, DB constructs a cuckoo filter CF k and inserts into it the entries retrieved in the previous step as shown in Steps 4-7. Insert HMAC k , in Step 7, is a modified version of the Insert procedure, where the fingerprint is replaced by an HMAC k function. DB uses HMAC k with the secret key k, provided by SU , to construct hashed entries and insert them to CF k . DB then sends CF k to QS via the high speed link that connects DB to QS .
SU constructs a string y by concatenating its location coordinates with a combination of one channel and its possible transmission parameters. Subsequently, SU hashes y using an HMAC with the secret key k and sends the new value y k to QS to find out whether CF k of QS contains y k . If the query's combination is found in CF k , then SU needs to take one further step: It senses the channel that was included in the query. If the result of the sensing complies with the outcome of the Lookup operation in CF k , then SU can conclude that this channel is available and, thus, it can use it for its future transmissions. In this case, SU can stop querying QS . The sensing operation is added to confirm the outcome of querying the cuckoo filter and overcome the risk of falling into the case of a false positive result that would eventually make SU interfere with primary transmissions. In case the sensing result is different from the outcome of the Lookup operation, then SU keeps changing the channel and the associated parameters until QS finds y k in CF k or until SU tries all possible channels and combinations.
This scheme considerably reduces the overhead perceived by SU s, as much of the computation is performed offline by DB , and SU s do not need to download the cuckoo filters which are only sent to QS over a high throughput link.
If DB knows the possible device characteristics of the querying SU s, this can help to further reduce the incurred overhead. Indeed, DB can pre-compute several cuckoo filters for each possible combination of potential device parameters offline by relying on a set of secret keys K = {k 1 , . . . , k z } that it generated beforehand. For each combination of parameters, DB constructs multiple CF k with different keys from K to make sure that each SU uses a different filter. SU s are not required to generate their own keys as in the previous variant. Whenever a SU queries DB for spectrum opportunities, DB shares a secret key k with it and sends the corresponding CF k to QS . SU uses k to construct its hashed strings and query CF k of QS just like in Algorithm 2.
Leveraging a Secure Hardware: As long as DB and QS do not collude, as stated in Security Assumption 2, neither of them can infer the coordinates of SU s from the keyed one-way function output. To mitigate the non-collusion requirement between FC and QS , LPDBQS could be implemented in a slightly different way by relying on a secure hardware (e.g., a secure co-processor or a trusted platform module) that can perform cryptographic operations without exposing its embedded private key. This hardware can be deployed inside DB itself and play the role of QS . Such a high-end secure hardware is physically shielded from penetration [38] , and any tampering from the adversary, potentially DB , triggers the automatic erasure of sensitive memory areas containing critical secrets [39] . When a secure hardware meets the FIPS 140-2 level 4 [40] physical security requirements, it becomes infeasible for FC to tamper with the operations executed by this hardware. DB sends the cuckoo filters to this hardware, and SU s have to query this hardware to learn about spectrum availabilities.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed schemes LPDB and LPDBQS . Theorem 1. Under Security Assumptions 1 and 2, LPDB does not leak any information on SU s' location.
Proof: We construct a history list H of each entity's knowledge about SU s' information during the execution of LPDB . SU . A SU cannot learn anything about other SU s information nor the filters {CF i,t } n−1,t f i=1,t=t0 that they receive from DB as the communication between each SU and DB is secured, i.e. H SU = ∅. Note that, even if, a SU would learn the filters of other SU s, i.e.
which contains the characteristics of the querying SU s. H DB may include information like frequency ranges in which SU can operate, antenna characteristics, etc. This information is not related to the querying SU s' location. This shows that the knowledge that DB gains during the execution of LPDB does not allow it to infer SU s' location when they try to learn about spectrum opportunities. LPDB offers an unconditional privacy in the sense that DB 's knowledge about SU s' location, during the execution of LPDB , does not increase compared to its initial knowledge, which is necessarily the coverage area of DB . 
are as secure as HMAC . The elements of {CF ki,t } n,t f i=1,t=t0 are computed using a pseudo random function (as an HMAC is also a pseudo random function) with SU s' secret keys
κ and κ is the security level. {y ki,t } n,t f i=1,t=t0 are independent from each other. The same applies to {CF ki,t } n,t f i=1,t=t0 . Each query from {y ki,t } n,t f i=1,t=t0 has a corresponding HMAC key, which means that even for the same SU querying the same information, there will be randomly independent and uniformly distributed outputs generated by DB and SU s. Since only SU s and DB know the keys {k i,t } n,t f i=1,t=t0 and that these keys are updated for every query made by SU s, QS cannot learn any information about SU s' location as long as it does not collude with DB as stated in Security Assumption 2. Correlating queries {y ki,t } n,t f i=1,t=t0 to SU s' physical location is equivalent to breaking the underlying HMAC or P RF , which is of probability 1/2 κ . We can conclude that LPDBQS is as secure as the underlying HMAC .
VII. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed schemes. We consider that DB 's covered area is modeled as a √ m × √ m grid that contains m cells each represented by one location pair (locX ,locY ) in DB . We use the efficient cuckoo filter implementation provided in [41] for our performance analysis with a very small false positive rate = 10 −8 and a load factor α = 0.95. In addition, since personal/portable TVBD devices of SU s can only transmit on available channels in the frequency bands 512 − 608 MHz (TV channels 21 − 36) and 614-698 MHz (TV channels 38 − 51), this means that users can only access 31 white-space TV band channels in a dynamic spectrum access manner [42] . Therefore, in our evaluation we set the number of TV channels s = 31.
Since in practice, at a given time, only a percentage of DB 's entries contains available channels, we have ran an experiment to learn what a realistic value of this percentage might be. We denote this percentage (averaged over time and space) as . We have used the Microsoft online white spaces database application [36] to identify and measure by monitoring 8 different US locations (Portland, San Faransico, Houston, Miami, Seattle, Boston, New York and Salt Lake City) for few days with an interval between successive measurements of 3 hours. Our measurements show that is about 6.8%.
Not only does this experiment allow us to evaluate the communication overhead, but also the computational overhead, especially from the database side since both overheads are linear functions of the percentage as we show in Table II .
There are several factors that influence the performance of both LPDB and LPDBQS . One of these factors is the percentage which has a significant influence on the performance of our schemes as we show in Table II and Figure 6 . Also, the number of cells in the grid covered by DB has a direct impact on the size of DB , and thus on the communication and computational overheads of DB as highlighted in Table II and Figures 3 and 5a . In fact, as the number of cells increases, the size of DB increases and so does the computational complexity of constructing the cuckoo filter. In addition, the false positive rate, , has an impact on the cost of storing one record in the cuckoo filter and subsequently on the communication overhead as we illustrate and discuss in Figure 4 and Table II . Finally, the fraction of positive queries, f p , can impact the lookup performance as we show and discuss in Figure 7a . We discuss these factors in more details in the next section.
Next, we also compare our schemes with respect to existing approaches in terms of (i) communication and computational overhead, and (ii) location privacy. Since the schemes in [22] , [27] try to achieve a different goal, which is the mutual location privacy between SU s and PU s, we do not include them in our overhead analysis. Note that, since the PIR protocol used in [25] has not been specified, we use the protocol proposed by Trostle et al. [24] used in PriSpectrum [23] in our performance comparison.
A. Communication and Computation Overhead 1) Communication Overhead:
We provide analytical expressions of the communication overhead of these schemes in Table II . For LPDB , we provide two expressions of the overhead with respect to two scenarios: (i) when SU s do not 
Variables: insert and lookup denote the cost of one Insert and Lookup operations in the Cuckoo Filter. β is the number of entries in a bucket of the cuckoo filter. p is a large prime used in the blinding factor of PriSpectrum, q is a large prime used in [25] , b denotes the number of bits that an SU shares with other SU s in [25] , ng is the number of SU s within a same group in [25] , v is the size of a block in DB [26] , and d is the umber of DB segments in [26] . M ulp and Expp denote a modular multiplication and a modular exponentiation operations over modulus p. σu denotes the amount of data exchanged during a process u, where u ∈ {query, HMAC }.
reveal one of their coordinates, (ii) when one of the coordinates is revealed by SU s. In both scenarios the data transmitted consist basically of query, sent by SU , and the response of DB to it. The size of the response generated by DB depends on the number of entries in DB that satisfy query and on the space needed to store each of these entities in CF . The number of entries for LPDB is given by · s · m and reduces to · s · √ m when one of the coordinates is revealed by SU . s · m and s · √ m provide the number of entries in DB that satisfy the query of SU for both scenarios. gives the percentage of those entries with available channels. LPDBQS incurs a slightly higher communication overhead than LPDB from a system point of view, as SU needs to additionally send a maximum of s · σ HMAC to QS . However, most of this overhead is incurred between DB and QS as SU s do not have to download CF s from DB anymore. For illustration purpose, we plot in Figure 3 the system communication overhead of the different schemes using the expressions established in Table II . As shown in Figure 3 , and as expected, LPDB is clearly more expensive than the other schemes in terms of communication overhead even when , determined experimentally, is equal to 6.8%. However, revealing one of the coordinates brings a huge gain and makes our scheme even better than existing approaches, yet without compromising the location privacy. LPDBQS has almost the same communication overhead as LPDB but with the difference that most of this overhead is incurred between DB and QS .
We study also the impact of varying the target false positive rate, , on the cost of inserting one record in the CF in bits as illustrated in Figure 4 . This has a direct impact on the size of the filter and thus the communication overhead of our schemes. We do this for multiple values of β, which is the number of slots per bucket in the cuckoo filter. As shown in Figure 4 , targeting a smaller value of costs more bits to store an item in the filter and subsequently increases the communication overhead. Increasing the value of β will require more bits per item to achieve the same target as illustrated in the Figure. 2) Computational Overhead: We also investigate the efficiency of our proposed schemes in terms of their computational overhead. We evaluate the computation required at each entity separately, and we provide the corresponding analytical expression of the overhead as shown in Table II . Again we provide two estimated costs for both scenarios of LPDB . The computation of DB is given in terms of the number of insertions it has to perform into CF . This depends on the number of DB entries that comply with query considering only the available channels. This number is equal to ·s ·m in LPDB and reduces to · s · √ m in LPDB with leakage. For the computational cost at the SU 's side, LPDB 's overhead depends solely on the number of possible channels, s, and the cost of one Hash and one Lookup operations, as shown in Table II . One of the reasons that motivated our use of the cuckoo filter, as we mentioned earlier, is that it is characterized by an extremely fast Lookup operation. This allows SU s to check whether a specific combination, y, exists in the filter, i.e. whether channel is available, very efficiently. LPDB 's overhead at SU 's side does not depend on the size of DB since any lookup query to CF always reads a fixed number of buckets (at most two) [33] , which makes our scheme more scalable than existing approaches in terms of computation when the size of DB increases. In LPDBQS , DB performs the same computation as in LPDB . The Lookup operations on CF are now outsourced to QS instead of SU s and QS needs to perform a maximum of s · lookup for every querying SU , which is very fast to perform as we mentioned earlier. Every SU needs to only construct HMAC -strings {y kt } t f t=t0 which could be done extremely quickly and could even be precomputed. Note that the PIR-based approaches have similar cost on DB 's side, since in any PIR scheme, the server is destined to have O(m) computation [24] .
For illustration purpose, we plot in Figure 5 the computational overhead incurred by each SU and DB , in the different schemes using the expressions established in Table II. Our schemes are much more efficient than existing approaches at both DB and SU sides as shown in Figures 5a & 5b. The gap keeps increasing considerably as the number of cells (i.e., the size of DB ) increases. This is due to the fact that these approaches' cost is dominated by an increasing number of modular multiplications which are very expensive compared to the Insert and Lookup operations of the cuckoo filter in our schemes.
We also evaluate the impact of other parameters on the overhead perceived by both SU s and DB as shown in Figure 7 . First, in Figure 7a , we illustrate the variation of the throughput of the lookup operations in million operations per second (MOPS) in a cuckoo filter of size 112M B as a function of the fraction of positive queries f p , i.e. queries for items that actually exist in the filter. This clearly shows the efficiency of the lookup operations that SU or QS has to perform to check availability information within CF . CF always fetches two buckets and thus achieves about the same performance when the queries are 100% positive or 100% negative and drops when f p = 50% for which the CPU's branch prediction is least accurate [33] .
We also assess the insertion throughput that DB experiences to construct the CF as a function of the load factor α as shown in Figure 7b . As opposed to the lookup throughput shown in Figure 7a , CF has a decreasing insert throughput when it is more filled (though their overall construction speed is still high). This is mainly due to the fact that CF may have to move a sequence of existing fingerprints recursively before successfully inserting a new item, and this process becomes more expensive when the load factor grows higher [33] .
3) Impact of varying the percentage of entries with available channels: We also study the impact of on the overhead incurred by our schemes. For this, we plot in Figure 6 the communication and the system computational overheads for different values of . We plot only LPDB and LPDB with leakage as LPDBQS has almost the same overhead as LPDB . As shown in Figure 6 , both overheads behave similarly in the way that decreasing when one of the coordinates is revealed doesn't impact much our scheme. LPDB w/ Leakage has the smallest overhead compared to the case where no leakage is allowed. On the other hand, decreasing this parameter drastically reduces the overhead of LPDB and even makes it comparable to LPDB w/ Leakage in terms of communication and computation. This means that in the case where only 1% or less of DB entries have available channels, there is no need to reveal one of the coordinates to reduce the overhead.
B. Location privacy
We compare our schemes to existing approaches in terms of location privacy level by presenting the security problems on which they rely as illustrated in Table III . We also precise the localization probability of SU s under these schemes. The best probability that could be achieved is 1/m, i.e. SU s are within DB coverage area. If one of the schemes is broken then this probability increases considerably. Zhang et al. [22] k-anonymity 1/k Zhang et al. [27] Geo-Indistinguishability 1/r
Variables: r is the radius of the -geo-indistinguishability mechanism in [27] .
LPDB offers unconditional security, as SU s do not share any information that could reveal their location. LPDB could be seen as a variant of PIR in which the server sends a whole copy of the database to the user and this is the only way to achieve information theoretic privacy (i.e. cannot be broken even with computationally unbounded adversary) in a singleserver setting. Even if one of the coordinates is intentionally revealed by a SU , its location is still indistinguishable from √ m − 1 remaining possible locations.
The approaches in [23] , [25] , [26] rely on computational PIR protocols to preserve SU s' location privacy. The security of Computational PIR protocols' is established against a computationally bounded adversary based on well-known cryptographic problems that are hard to solve (e.g. discrete logarithm or factorization [43] ). This means that these approaches offer lower security level than LPDB .
The approach proposed by Zhang et al. [22] relies on the concept of k-anonymity, which offers very low privacy level as the probability of identifying the location of a querying SU is equal to 1/k. Also, an approach cannot be proved to satisfy k-anonymity unless assumptions are made about the attacker's auxiliary information. For instance, dummy locations are only useful if they look equally likely to be the real location from the adversary's point of view. Any auxiliary information that allows the attacker to rule out any of those locations would immediately violate the definition.
As we have shown in Section VI, LPDBQS is as secure as its underlying HMAC which is breakable only with probability of 1/2 κ , where κ is the security level. For the same security level, HMAC incurs much less communication overhead than that of the computational PIR protocols in [23] , [25] , [26] .
Zhang et al. [27] propose an approach whose privacy depends on the -geo-indistinguishability [28] mechanism, which is derived from the differential privacy concept. In this mechanism, a SU sends a randomly chosen point z close to its location, but that still allows it to get a useful service. An informal, definition of this mechanism as given in [28] is as follows: A mechanism satisfies -geo-indistinguishability if and only if for any radius r > 0, the user enjoys -privacy within a radius r, where = r and is the privacy level per unit of distance. A user is said to enjoy -privacy within r if, by observing z, the adversary's ability to find the user's location among all points within r, does not increase by more than a factor depending on compared to the case when z is unknown [28] . The smaller the stronger the privacy the user enjoys. SU can specify its privacy level requirement by providing the radius r it is concerned about, and the privacy level that it wishes for this specific radius. Relying on this mechanism in the context of CRN , is problematic because, first, it introduces some noise to SU 's location which may cause erroneous spectrum availability information and, subsequently, interference with primary transmissions. Second, to avoid facing the previous issue, SU may need to pick the radius that can still give it accurate information which means necessarily that r << √ m. Hence, even though the adversary will be unable to pinpoint the exact location of the SU , it will be able though to learn that it is within the radius r from the the shared location z.
In summary, as can be seen in Table III and as explained above, LPDB offers the highest location privacy level as it achieves information-theoretic security. LPDBQS can offer similar security guarantees as computational PIR-based approaches but with significantly better computational and communication overhead thanks to the use of HMAC .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed two location privacy preserving schemes, called LPDB and LPDBQS , that aim to preserve the location privacy of SU s in database-driven CRN s. They both use set membership data structures to transmit a compact representation of the geo-location database to either SU or QS , so that SU can query it to check whether a specific channel is available in its vicinity. These schemes require different architectural and performance tradeoffs.
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